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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
DAVY GENARO VALENCIANO 
Defendant/Appellant. ' 
Appellate Court No. 20070216-CA 
BRIEF OFAPPELIANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction based upon an Alford plea of guilty by 
the Defendant to the charge of Distributing, Offering and/or Arranging to 
Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony. The plea of guilty 
was taken before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan on the 10th day of July 
2007. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-2(j) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA? 
1 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for 
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 114-115), and 
hearings and a ruling on that motion (R. 142/3). 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State 
v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)." The Court applies "the clearly 
erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction 
with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). 
"However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied 
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 
556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 
1996)). 
POINT II 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO 
INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
CASE. 
2 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for 
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 114-115), and 
hearings and a ruling on that motion (R. 142/3). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter of 
fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was 
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section. 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Article I, Section 12, [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
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testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly 
and intentionally; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
§78-2a-2(j) Court of Appeals Jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11(e) 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, 
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
5 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may 
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, 
if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to enable 
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 27, 2006, the Defendant was charged with the offense of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a first degree 
felony; Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a first 
degree felony; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. On 
February 13, 2007, a preliminary hearing was held; and the Defendant was 
arraigned on the charges by the Court. (R. 140/59). The Defendant pled guilty 
to the amended charge of a simple distribution though an Alford plea. 
(R. 141/7). Defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on: 
(1) the Defendant felt he was misled regarding the nature of the evidence 
against him; (2) the Defendant was not able to see all the evidence against him; 
(3) the Defendant felt he was not guilty; (4) the drugs were planted on him by 
his wife; and (5) the Defendant had been continually harassed by police 
officers. The motion to withdraw his plea was filed on August 8, 2007; and the 
Court, after written and oral argument, denied the motion on August 28, 2007, 
based upon the Courts determination of a sufficient plea colloquy. (R. 142/4). 
On October 9, 2007, Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the 
Utah State Prison for one to fifteen years. (R. 143/4). The Defendant filed a 
notice of appeal on November 9, 2007. (R. 41). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 27, 2006, the Defendant was charged with the offense of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a first degree 
felony in violation of UCA § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii); Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a first degree felony in violation of UCA § 
5 8-3 7-8( 1 )(a)(ii); and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor in 
violation of UCA § 58-37a-5(l). A preliminary hearing was held on February 
13, 2007. (R. 140) The Court found probable cause on all counts, and 
Defendant was bound over for trial. 
On July 10, 2007, after plea negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to one 
amended count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a second degree 
felony while the other two charges were dismissed. Shortly after entering the 
plea, and before sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. 
(R. 114-115). Defendant's reasoning for this motion to withdraw his plea was 
that he was mislead by his trial attorney, that he did not get to see all of the 
evidence against him, and that he was not guilty. (R.l 14-115). The Defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied. (R.l42/4). 
At the plea hearing the trial court went through all the elements as set 
forth by Rule 11. The court informed the Defendant the possible maximum 
sentence that he could receive by pleading guilty (R. 141 19). She asked the 
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Defendant if he was "doing this of your own free will and choice?" (R.141/15). 
She asked if the Defendant was under the influence of anything that would 
affect his judgment. (R.141/15). She informed the Defendant of his right to a 
presumption of innocence, and that the burden of proof was on the prosecutor 
to prove him guilty of each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 
(R. 141 / 7). The trial court also told the Defendant that his appeal rights would 
be limited by a plea of guilty, and that all the other rights explained would be 
forfeited by pleading guilty (R. 141 / 13). The Defendant had reviewed a 
statement in advance of plea (R. 141/9), which the Defendant acknowledged 
reviewing with his counsel. 
The Defendant thereafter filed a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty on 
August 8, 2007 (R. 114-115). The Defendant did not file any supporting 
memorandum with the motion, and the State filed a two-page objection to the 
motion (R. 116-118). The Defendant was then sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment not to exceed one to fifteen years on October 9, 2007. (R. 143/4). 
At the time of oral argument on the Defendant's motion, his attorney 
related that the Defendant believed that there were contradictory evidentiary 
issues (R. 143/3). The Defendant later told the Court that at the time of the 
plea "I was under drugs... I wasn't in my right mind when I made my 
decision." (R. 143/5). Based upon the fact that the trial court had gone through 
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the elements set forth under Rule 11, the court denied the Defendant's motion 
to withdraw his plea (R. 143 /4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant argues that under the constitutions of both the state and 
federal governments, as well as Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a Defendant cannot plead guilty if he does not voluntarily and 
knowingly enter into the plea agreement. The requirement that a Defendant's 
plea must be voluntary has its basis in both constitutional and statutory law, as 
well as under the general principle of justice. In the present case the Defendant 
believes that these basic guarantees of justice were denied him. The Defendant 
had been confused and just before entering the guilty plea, he requested the 
Court to present the evidence against him. (R. 141/2). The Defendant pled at the 
time of the pretrial conference despite the fact that he was asking for evidence 
against him and stated he felt his previous attorney at the preliminary hearing 
was not helpful. (R. 141/3) 
The Defendant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance 
of counsel by the failure of his appointed counsel to adequately review the 
evidence with the Defendant. 
While the Defendant acknowledges that the trial court reviewed with 
him the rights required under Rule 11, and further acknowledges that he 
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reviewed and signed the statement in advance of plea, he believes that his plea 
was nevertheless involuntary. The Defendant believes that his plea counsel did 
not adequately discuss the State's evidence against him or explain it so he 
could understand the evidence. He also was unable to intelligently discuss the 
ramifications of pleading guilty versus going to trial with his trial counsel 
without this vital information. 
The Defendant understands that the Utah Appellate Courts have 
presumed that a Defendant has voluntarily entered a plea when the trial court 
complies with the required elements of Rule 11. The question as to whether or 
not the Defendant understood the evidence against him, however, is uncertain, 
when he had asked to hear evidence against him just moments before entering 
into the plea. The Defendant is asking this Court to reverse the trial courts 
denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, and allow the Defendant to proceed 
to trial on the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA 
On July 10, 2007, the Defendant entered a guilty plea to the second-
degree felony drug charge. On August 8, 2007, the Defendant moved the trial 
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court to allow him to withdraw that plea. The trial court thereafter heard 
written and oral arguments on the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
The trial court denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
The Court in the case of State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993) 
held that the appellate court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." The Court has 
further noted that it applies "the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's 
findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 
983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). "However, the ultimate question of whether 
the trial court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural requirements 
for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." 
State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 
911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)) 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure provides: 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
The trial court, therefore, must ensure that the Defendant is voluntarily 
entering his plea, and has a duty to ensure that the Defendant is not being 
coerced or pressured in any manner. A trial court abuses its discretion by 
failing to grant the motion to withdraw the plea when a Rule 11 violation is 
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present. In the ease of State v. Humphrey, 2003 UT App. 333, % 10, 79 P.3d 
960 this Court held: 
In the past, we have held that Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure creates "a presumption the plea was entered 
voluntarily1' and "good cause exists where the plea was entered 
involuntarily." State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). In Thorup, we confirmed that compliance with Rule 11 is 
not dispositive in determining a motion to withdraw a plea. A 
defendant can show good cause by putting forth evidence that the 
plea was in fact involuntary. 
In the present case, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his 
plea based on Rule 11 violations of voluntariness. 
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony. The Defendant entered into this 
plea without fully understanding all of the evidence against him and had 
unresolved questions regarding the evidence. The Defendant felt pressured to 
enter into the agreement although Defendant believed he was not guilty. The 
Defendant did not have the opportunity to discuss with his trial counsel his 
concerns about the inconsistent evidence against him despite the fact he had 
met with his attorney on two occasions. 
In the case of State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
the Court ruled that, "[b]oth the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have allowed a Rule 11 challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be 
considered for the first time on appeal." 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266, 1274 (Utah 1988) held "Brady and Hammond1 require that in order for a 
plea to be voluntarily and knowingly made, the defendant must understand the 
nature and value of any promises made to him." (emphasis added) In the 
Copeland decision, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for 
further findings regarding the defendant's mental state and his understanding of 
the plea negotiation promises. However, the Court noted: 
There are several problems with the plea bargain entered into by 
defendant. First, it appears either that he misunderstood the 
promise the State made to him regarding its sentencing 
recommendation or that the promise was illusory. Second, and 
more serious, is the claim that defendant's understanding of the 
promise caused him to be misled about the sentencing options 
available to the court and therefore the value of the bargain into 
which he was entering. (Id. at 1274) 
In the present case, the Defendant clearly did not understand the affects 
of the plea negotiations. He had asked the Court to show the evidence against 
him, despite the fact he had already had a preliminary hearing. Defendant 
further brought to the attention of his attorney some inconsistencies regarding 
evidence. Defendant then entered into an Alford plea, assuming that because he 
was pleading guilty, but not admitting his guilt to the crime, he would have the 
opportunity to review the evidence prior to sentencing and withdraw his guilty 
1
 Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 742 (1970) 
Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975) 
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plea. Admittedly, the trial court asked the Defendant, "do you have any 
questions at all?" to which the Defendant stated "no". The trial court also asked 
the Defendant if he was entering the plea on his own free will, to which the 
Defendant again responded affirmatively. The complicating factor was that the 
Defendant felt pressured and felt misled by the very counsel who was supposed 
to ensure that no pressure was present and that he understood the evidence 
against him. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Norris, 2002 UT App. 
305, f^ 11 57 P.3d 238, reversed a defendant's conviction by guilty plea, when 
it determined: 
Both the trial court and the State clearly promised Norris that 
he could pursue a claim for vindictive prosecution on appeal, 
but neither the court nor the State could fulfill that promise. 
The court's legal error exaggerated the benefits Norris would 
receive from pleading guilty. Thus it misled Norris as to "the 
nature and value of [the] promise[] made to him." (Quoting 
State v. CopelanddX 111 A.) 
The Court held: "Thus, Norris's pleas were not made voluntarily with full 
knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty." (Id. at 241) 
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to establish the basic requirement 
of Rule 11, in that the court did not ensure that the plea was voluntarily taken. 
Specifically, the court, knowing that the Defendant had just minutes before 
entering into the guilty plea asked to hear the evidence against him and had 
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stated to the court that at the time of his preliminary hearing his counsel did not 
properly represent him, asked for his motion for discovery. (R. 141/3-4). 
Further, Defendant pled guilty to an Alford plea (R. 141/14); and there was not 
an adequate record to ensure that the Defendant did in fact "understand the 
nature and value of any promises made to him." {State v. Copeland infra 
emphasis added). 
The Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and face 
this charge due to his lack of understanding of the evidence against him on the 
charge. Before the trial court fulfills its duties in ensuring that the defendant 
fully understands the ramifications of his plea, and until this understanding is 
guaranteed, the trial court should not allow a plea of guilty to proceed. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO 
INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
CASE. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
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assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Sfrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80L.Ed.2dat693. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave 
some guidance in noting: "The proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 
688) Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the 
obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney 
performance" (Id. at 688), it did mention certain minimal requirements. These 
duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest" as well 
as a duty "to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the 
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution" (Id. at 688) Additionally, the overreaching requirement by the 
Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that the 
"performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances." (Id. at 688) 
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's 
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
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In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the Court 
was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct 
proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that 
reversal. In that affirmation of reversal the Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, 
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence 
in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v. 
Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to comport with 
constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct 
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only 
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while 
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for 
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary.11 [citation omitted] Under 
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance 
was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the 
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's 
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional 
assistance in the respects alleged. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All 
U.S. 365,386(1986)) 
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In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, (U.S. 
2003), the U.S. Supreme Court found that counsel's failure to investigate the 
extensive abuse the defendant had suffered through his life was unreasonable. 
The Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that this failure resulted in 
defense counsel's inability to present this evidence to the sentencing jury in a 
capital case. The Court stated: 
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this 
considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable 
probability that it would have returned with a different sentence. 
(Wiggins v. Smith at Point III) 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have 
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can 
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties. 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the 
Court held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a Fourth Amendment 
violation constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. In that 
case, the Court applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel 
had in a pretrial motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal 
search. The trial court denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary 
hearing. During trial the officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of 
plain view, yet trial counsel did not re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court 
held that "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate 
19 
tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is 
satisfied.1' (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993)) 
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court 
expanded the Stiickland test in certain circumstances. The Court stated: 
It is true that while the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance 
for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, 
there are situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental 
fairness may affect the analysis. 
In Williams v. Taylor, the Court reversed the defendant's death sentence 
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the defense counsel did not 
investigate the defendant's "nightmarish childhood", nor the fact that the 
defendant was "borderline mentally retarded" (Id. at 395, 396) The Court 
concluded that defense counsel unreasonably failed to begin mitigation 
investigation until one week prior to trial, and then unreasonably failed to 
investigate numerous areas of mitigating evidence that could have benefited the 
defendant in the penalty phase. 
In the case of State v. Bennett 2000 UT 34, ^ 13, 999 P.2d 1, Justice 
Durham, in a concurring opinion noted: 
If 13 This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which 
has been recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 
921 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of 
counsel case, that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power 
over the courts, we may presume prejudice in circumstances 
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where it is unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case 
inquiry to weigh actual prejudice" 
In the present case, the representation of the Defendant taken as a whole 
was defective, and constitutionally inadequate. First, the Defendant had four 
different attorneys. The first two did not show up to court hearings, the third 
did not vigorously represent him during the preliminary hearing, and his fourth 
counsel allowed him to enter into a plea agreement when counsel knew the 
Defendant had questions regarding the nature of the evidence against him and 
despite the fact counsel knew that the Defendant believed he was innocent of 
the crimes charged. The defense counsel's failure to provide the Defendant 
with discovery motions, coupled with the speed in which defense counsel 
pushed this matter through to plea, constitutes this inadequacy. The plea was 
taken on the same day that the Defendant had just minutes before asked the 
Court to hear evidence against him and requested discovery documents. 
Rule 1.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct governing lawyers 
provides in relevant part: 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation. 
Clearly there was a failure by defense counsel in the present case to properly 
comply with these requirements. Defense counsel did not "promptly comply 
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with reasonable requests for information" nor did counsel "explain a matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed 
decisions." 
A defendant should not have to jump into a plea bargain under a cloud of 
fear and misunderstanding. If nothing more, plea counsel should adequately 
explain the effects of the plea, provide the defendant with relevant reports and 
information, and allow the defendant time to digest this information and come 
to a reasoned and logical decision devoid of pressure. In the present case this 
simply did not occur. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary 
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second 
part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
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proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the 
determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should "consider 
the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the 
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
Clearly, in the present case, if defense counsels had spent the appropriate 
time discussing the case with his client, and providing him with requested 
discovery documents concerning his case, and informing him the difficulty to 
withdraw a plea despite the fact it was an Alford plea, the plea would not have 
been entered. This meets the second prong of the Strickland test in that "the 
result[s] of the proceeding would have been different." 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully asks this Court to 
reverse the trial courts denial of his motion to withdraw his plea and allow him 
to proceed to trial on the case. f >, 
DATED t h i s ^ day of May 2008. / / / / ] 
RANDALL ^ . RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Davy Valenciano, 
61904066. 
Let me just first say that I realize that there's 
been a motion to withdraw the plea, but the State has 
responded to it already. I took it upon myself simply to go 
ahead and review the tape that I -- of the -- of the plea 
that I had taken. I've reviewed the State's response. I've 
reviewed what was filed, and I'm prepared to go ahead and 
just handle that today. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
MR. LYON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Is there any argument on that motion? I 
realize you -- that you filed it, Mr. Bouwhuis, on behalf of 
Mr. Valenciano. The State has responded, and I'm not sure 
anything else is going to be, you know, particularly helpful 
but — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Right. And I talked to 
Mr. Valenciano about it, and he -- the only thing he had to 
say m addition was just to expound on a couple of the 
evidentiary problems, but that -- that doesn't change — 
THE COURT: If you want to do that, that's fine, but 
it's --
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, he just indicated that there 
was an item of evidence regarding which room he was found m 
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and whic h room he was supposed to have come from. He 
indicates there's a contradiction in the reports on tha 
also inc licates the receipt supposedly showing that he h 
rented the room they thought he was in didn't have his 




should have been attacked. 
THE COURT: Anything from the State? 
MR. LYON: We'll submit it on the brief. 
THE COURT: Okay. The brief was filed by the 
that properly states the current status of the 
the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered 







withdrawing the plea. 
I'm going to deny your motion to withdraw the plea. 
I was particularly interested in reviewing the tape to make 
sure that everything had been done properly. And not only 
did you read the statement in support of the guilty plea, you 
acknowledged that you read and understood it, you -- you -- I 
also went through in great detail what your rights were in 
addition to what was stated in the -- in the statement in 
support of a guilty plea which had been read to you by 
Mr. Bouwhuis. 
I indicated to you that you could file a motion to 
withdraw your plea but it was highly unlikely that I was 
going to grant it if you entered a plea of guilty that day 
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because I felt that after we had gone through it, I had | 
answered all your questions, you had had an ample opportunity 
to make a decision about whether you wanted to do this. I 
specifically stated to you are you sure this is what you, in 
fact, want to do. 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor --
THE COURT: You said that you did, and I'm going to 
deny your motion to withdraw the plea. It was clearly done 
voluntarily. You knew what you were doing. I'm convinced of 
that, and I'm not going to let you withdraw it, just as I 
indicated I wasn't going to absent some showing that we had 
done something wrong at that time. 
I don't think I could have done any more in terms of 
taking the plea in terms of informing you what your rights 
were, gave -- giving you ample opportunity to change your 
mind if you wanted to do that. I was certain after talking 
with you at that date that that's, in fact, what you chose to 
do. You voluntarily entered your plea. And --
THE DEFENDANT: Can I say something? 
THE COURT: Well, I'm -- you've just had your 
attorney speak for you. I've reviewed the motion. I'm going 
to deny your motion, and I'm ready to go ahead with 
sentencing, and I -- you know, I realize you may have 
something to say with regard to sentencing, but that's fine. 
You can say that. But as far as withdrawing your plea, I'm 
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1 I not going to allow you to do that. 
2 | MR. BOUWHUIS: I didn't get a presentence report. I 
got a --
4 I THE COURT: There wasn't one done because he refused 
5 I to give a --
6 | MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
7 | THE COURT: -- statement. So I'm ready to go ahead 
with --
9 | THE DEFENDANT: I didn't refuse anything, Your 
10 | Honor. I just told them I wasn't -- I had changed my plea 
11 | and I (inaudible) speak to my attorney. 
12 I THE COURT: Right. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: I wanted to speak to him before I 
14 did anything. I didn't deny anything, and I -- this whole 
15 case has been messed up. I was under drugs. I was under all 
16 that. You can see by the picture the way I look now compared 
17 to when I've got my head on straight. I know what went on 
18 that day and everything. I wasn't in my right mind when I 
19 made my decision. You can see --
20 THE COURT: That's not what you stated in your 
21 motion to withdraw your plea, and I specifically asked you at 
22 the time I took your plea all those questions. So we're not 
23 going to go back --
24 THE DEFENDANT: I sent you a letter saying I — 
25 that's what happened. I sent you personally saying I 
wasn't -- I was under a lot of stress. Personally I sent you 
a letter when I got incarcerated. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to let you withdraw your 
plea. This case has been going on and --
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, but it's not my fault --
THE COURT: No --
THE DEFENDANT: -- it's been going on. 
THE COURT: -- just a minute. 
THE DEFENDANT: It's not just me making judgments 
and setting court dates. 
THE COURT: Let's go ahead -- I'm willing to go 
ahead with sentencing today. I'm not sure a presentence 
report is going to be all that helpful anyway, given the 
facts of this case and given the charge and given the 
defendant's guilty plea to it. 
So, Mr. Bouwhuis, do you want to go ahead with 
anything? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, I guess the challenge I have is 
I don't have a presentence report. I don't know what his 
record is. I don't know the standard things that we would 
have with a presentence report regarding his background, 
employment, the family, substance abuse history, and whatnot, 
so I'm not really prepared on this. 
MR. LYON: We'll leave it to Your Honor's 
discretion. The State's -- I've had a chance to briefly 
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review his criminal record. I think it's a prison -- I think 
it should be a prison recommendation, but we'll leave it to 
Your Honor's discretion. 
THE COURT: Well, you know, I suppose to avoid any 
problem in the future I'll get a presentence report. I'm not 
sure it's going to be helpful because, frankly, dealing drugs 
is a prison offense as far as I'm concerned --
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor --
THE COURT: -- especially in a case like this. I'll 
get a presentence report. That's the end of that. Okay? 
I'm reluctant to do it, but I'll do it because I don't want 
any criticism later on so --
PROBATION OFFICER: October 9th, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: October 9th at 2:00 o'clock you'll be 
sentenced on this charge. 
THE BAILIFF: Let's go. Let's go. 
THE DEFENDANT: Speak to him? 
THE BAILIFF: Nope. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(End of proceedings.) 
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